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1  INTRODUCTION
Recent research has shown that investment activity induces a critical implication for in°ation
targeting interest rate policy in sticky price models. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) derive a
necessary condition for (local) determinacy of equilibrium in a Calvo (1983)-style sticky price
model and ¯nd that in°ation-forecast targeting interest rate policy makes determinacy essen-
tially impossible.1 Even when the policy response to an in°ation forecast is active (i.e. satis¯es
the Taylor principle), indeterminacy is induced due to a cost channel of monetary policy that
stems from investment spending, as emphasized by Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2008).
This channel leads a rise in the real interest rate to increase the expected future real rental
price of capital via a no-arbitrage condition between bonds and capital and hence to raise the
expected future real marginal cost of production, which feeds into in°ation expectations in the
New Keynesian Phillips curve. Consequently, active policy responses to the in°ation forecast,
which increase the real interest rate, make in°ation expectations self-ful¯lling, thereby causing
indeterminacy.2
This indeterminacy is a critical issue for central banks, since they are concerned about
expected future in°ation rather than current in°ation, as indicated by empirical studies such
as Clarida, Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1998, 2000). We therefore take as given the empirical ¯nding
that interest rate policy is based at least to some degree on an in°ation forecast. Because
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) show that the policy response to current in°ation possesses desir-
able properties in terms of determinacy in a sticky price model with investment, we investigate
interest rate policy that targets a weighted average of an in°ation forecast and current in°a-
tion.3 Speci¯cally, we examine a necessary and su±cient condition for this interest rate policy
1Huang and Meng (2007) obtain a similar indeterminacy result using a quadratic price adjustment cost model.
2To avoid this indeterminacy, Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2008) propose introducing a response to current
output or interest rate smoothing into the policy. Huang, Meng, and Xue (2009) numerically investigate the role
of the policy response to current output for determinacy in a Calvo-style sticky price model with sticky wages
and ¯rm-speci¯c capital.
3Determinacy properties of the average-in°ation targeting interest rate policy are also analyzed by Zanetti
2to ensure determinacy. This condition demonstrates that the average-in°ation targeting policy
guarantees determinacy as long as both the response to average in°ation and the relative weight
of current in°ation are large enough. The average-in°ation targeting policy inherits the deter-
minacy properties of current-in°ation targeting interest rate policy, which ensures determinacy
when its response is su±ciently large. We also show that past-in°ation targeting interest rate
policy guarantees determinacy when its response satis¯es the Taylor principle and is not large.
These results still hold, even when wages and hours worked are determined by Nash bar-
gaining as Zanetti (2006) suggests, rather than being determined in a competitive labor market
as our baseline model assumes. Recent literature has seen a surge of interest in the role of labor
markets in sticky prices models. The bulk of this literature has introduced labor market search
and matching frictions along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).4 Speci¯cally, ¯rms
pay a cost of posting vacancies in order to adjust their employment, and wages and hours
worked are determined by bargaining between ¯rms and workers. In sticky price models with
investment, however, incorporating such labor market frictions makes determinacy conditions
hard to examine analytically, because it adds one more predetermined variable, i.e. employ-
ment.5 Adopting the Nash bargaining over wages and hours worked is thus motivated as a
¯rst step toward the analysis of determinacy in sticky price models with investment and labor
market search and matching frictions while retaining the analytical characterization of deter-
minacy conditions. Because the Nash bargaining outcome is privately e±cient, hours worked
satisfy the same condition as in the baseline model while wages play only a distributive role.
Then, equilibrium dynamics is independent of an equilibrium condition for wages, as shown
later. Therefore, the model with Nash bargaining has exactly the same determinacy properties
(2006). Ness¶ en and Vestin (2005) study in°ation and output gap variability under outcome-based average-
in°ation targeting policies that take the form of targeting rules rather than instrument rules.
4See e.g. Krause and Lubik (2007), Trigari (2009), and Walsh (2005).
5In Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2010), we ¯nd that in a sticky price model without investment, labor
market search and matching frictions almost always induce indeterminacy of equilibrium under in°ation-forecast
targeting interest rate policy which satis¯es the Taylor principle.
3as the baseline model.6
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the model,
Section 2 shows the results, and Section 3 concludes.
1 THE MODEL
The model is a generalization of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) in that interest rate policy re-
sponds to a weighted average of an in°ation forecast and current in°ation. In the economy there
are a representative household, a representative ¯nal-good ¯rm, a continuum of intermediate-
good ¯rms, and a monetary authority. This section describes each agent's behavior in turn.
The household is in¯nitely lived with preferences over consumption ct, real money balances






¯t [V (ct;mt) ¡ Lt];
where ¯ 2 (0;1) is the subjective discount factor, Mt is nominal money balances held at the
end of period t, and Pt is the price of ¯nal goods. The period utility function U is separable
between hours worked and the other arguments, and the elasticity of labor supply is in¯nite.
The household enters period t with a capital stock Kt¡1, nominal money balances Mt¡1,
and nominal one-period bonds Bt¡1, which pay the gross nominal interest rate Rt¡1. The
household starts period t by trading bonds and renting out capital and labor respectively at
the real rental price rt and at the real wage rate wt. Subsequently, the household purchases ¯nal
goods for consumption ct and investment [Kt¡(1¡±)Kt¡1], where ± 2 (0;1) is the depreciation
rate of capital. The household receives pro¯ts Dt from ¯rms and a lump-sum transfer Tt from
the monetary authority. Thus, the household faces its budget constraint
Mt + Bt + Ptct + Pt[Kt ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Kt¡1] = Mt¡1 + Bt¡1Rt¡1 + Pt(wtLt + rtKt¡1) + Dt + Tt:
The ¯rst-order conditions for the household's optimal decisions on labor supply, investment,
6This demonstrates the failure of Proposition 1 of Zanetti (2006), as explained later.




Uc(t) = ¯ Uc(t + 1)(rt+1 + 1 ¡ ±); (2)










where Uc(t) and Um(t) denote the marginal utility of consumption and real money balances in
period t and ¼t = Pt=Pt¡1 is the gross in°ation rate.
On the production side, there is a continuum of intermediate-good ¯rms i 2 [0;1], each
of which produces one kind of di®erentiated good and sells the product to the representative
¯nal-good ¯rm under monopolistic competition.
The ¯nal-good ¯rm produces output Yt by choosing a combination of intermediate inputs
fyt(i)g so as to maximize pro¯ts PtYt ¡
R 1
0 Pt(i)yt(i)di given intermediate-good prices fPt(i)g
and the CES production technology Yt = (
R 1
0 yt(i)(´¡1)=´di)´=(´¡1) with the elasticity ´ > 1.
The ¯rst-order conditions for the ¯nal-good ¯rm's pro¯t maximization imply that its demand
for each intermediate good is yt(i) = Yt(Pt(i)=Pt)¡´, while perfect competition in the ¯nal-good








Also, the ¯nal-good market clearing condition is
Yt = ct + Kt ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Kt¡1: (6)
Each intermediate-good ¯rm i produces output yt(i) by choosing a cost-minimizing combi-
nation of capital and labor for the pair of the real rental price and the real wage rate frt;wtg
and the Cobb-Douglas production technology yt(i) = (Kt¡1(i))®(Lt(i))1¡® with the cost share
of capital ® 2 (0;1). In the presence of competitive labor and rental capital markets, all
intermediate-good ¯rms choose an identical capital-labor ratio and face the same real marginal







where xt = Lt=Kt¡1. Also, aggregating the Cobb-Douglas production technology over intermediate-
good ¯rms yields Ytdt = K®
t¡1L1¡®
t = Kt¡1x1¡®
t , where dt =
R 1
0 (Pt(i)=Pt)¡´di measures the





= ct + Kt ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Kt¡1: (8)





























Facing the ¯nal-good ¯rm's demand, each intermediate-good ¯rm sets the price of its prod-
uct as in Calvo (1983). Each period a fraction 1 ¡ º 2 (0;1) of intermediate-good ¯rms can
reoptimize prices, while the remaining fraction º charges the previous-period prices adjusted
for steady-state gross in°ation ¼. Thus all intermediate-good ¯rms that can reoptimize prices

















where ¤t = Uc(t)=Pt is the marginal utility of one dollar. The ¯rst-order condition for this















6The monetary authority conducts Taylor (1993)-style interest rate policy that responds to
a weighted average of an in°ation forecast and current in°ation
logRt = logR + ¿ [° log¼t+1 + (1 ¡ °)log¼t ¡ log¼]; (13)
where R denotes the steady-state gross nominal interest rate, ¿ > 0 is the policy response to
the weighted average in°ation, and ° 2 [0;1] is the weight of the in°ation forecast relative to
current in°ation. This policy is a generalization of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005), who consider
the two special cases of ° = 0;1. While Carlstrom and Fuerst report that the policy response to
current in°ation possesses desirable properties in terms of determinacy in a sticky price model
with investment, empirical studies such as Clarida, Gal¶ ³, and Gertler (1998, 2000) suggest
that central banks are concerned about expected future in°ation rather than current in°ation.
The average-in°ation targeting policy takes this concern into account by placing weight on the
in°ation forecast and simultaneously inherits the determinacy properties of the current-in°ation
targeting policy.
The equilibrium conditions are now given by (4), (5), (7)¡(13), and the law of motion of the
intermediate-good price dispersion dt. Since this dispersion is of second order under the Calvo-
style staggered price-setting and its steady-state value is one, log-linearizing the equilibrium
conditions and rearranging the resulting equations yields
^ wt = ^ zt ¡ ®^ xt; (14)
^ mt = ´c^ ct ¡ ´R ^ Rt; (15)
^ Kt = (1 + c=K) ^ Kt¡1 + (1 ¡ ®)(Y=K)^ xt ¡ (c=K)^ ct; (16)
¡¾¡1^ ct + Â^ mt = ®^ xt ¡ ^ zt; (17)
®^ xt ¡ ^ zt = [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ®)]^ xt+1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)^ zt+1; (18)
®^ xt ¡ ^ zt = ^ Rt + ®^ xt+1 ¡ ^ ¼t+1 ¡ ^ zt+1; (19)
^ ¼t = ¸^ zt + ¯^ ¼t+1; (20)
^ Rt = ¿ [°^ ¼t+1 + (1 ¡ °)^ ¼t]; (21)
7where hatted variables denote log-deviations from steady-state values, ´c;´R > 0 measure the
consumption elasticity and the interest rate semielasticity of money demand, c=K;Y=K > 0 are
steady-state ratios of consumption and output to capital, ¾ > 0 measures the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption, Â represents the degree of non-separability of the
period utility function between consumption and real money balances, and ¸ = (1 ¡ º)(1 ¡
¯º)=º > 0 is the real marginal cost elasticity of in°ation.
Combining (15)¡(17) to substitute out ^ ct and ^ mt+1, we obtain
^ Kt = (1 + c=K) ^ Kt¡1 + f(1 ¡ ®)(Y=K) + [®¾=(1 ¡ ¾´cÂ)](c=K)g ^ xt
¡ [¾=(1 ¡ ¾´cÂ)](c=K)^ zt + [¾´RÂ=(1 ¡ ¾´cÂ)](c=K) ^ Rt: (22)
Since the real wage rate condition (14) is static and the rate ^ wt appears only there, equilib-
rium dynamics is determined by the system of ¯ve equations (18)¡(22) with ¯ve variables
^ ¼t; ^ xt; ^ zt; ^ Kt¡1; ^ Rt.
2 RESULTS
In this section, we present and illustrate a necessary and su±cient condition for determinacy
of equilibrium under the average-in°ation targeting interest rate policy. We then examine
whether past-in°ation targeting interest rate policy ensures determinacy. Moreover, we inves-
tigate whether introducing Nash bargaining over wages and hours worked into the model alters
implications for determinacy.
2.1 NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR DETERMINACY
Analyzing the system of ¯ve log-linearized equilibrium conditions (18)¡(22) with ¯ve variables
^ ¼t; ^ xt; ^ zt; ^ Kt¡1; ^ Rt leads to the following proposition, which provides a necessary and su±cient
condition for determinacy under the average-in°ation targeting interest rate policy (21).
Proposition 1 Let a1 = 1¡¯(1¡±)(1¡®) and a2 = 1¡¯(1¡±). In the model, a necessary
8and su±cient condition for determinacy of equilibrium consists of the following three7
1 < ¿; (23)




0 < (1 ¡ °)¿2 +
(1 ¡ °)f¯(1 ¡ ®)(a2)2 ¡ ®[¸a1 + (1 ¡ ¯)a2]g ¡ ®¯a2
®¸[(1 ¡ °)® + °a1]
¿ +
¯a2[®¸ + (1 ¡ ¯)a2]
®¸2[(1 ¡ °)® + °a1]
or 3¯a2 < j°¸a1¿ ¡ [¸a1 + (1 + ¯)a2]j: (25)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Condition (23) is the Taylor principle, which suggests that the nominal interest rate should
be raised by more than the increase in any weighted average of the in°ation forecast and
current in°ation. Note that the necessary and su±cient condition for determinacy depends
on the cost share of capital ®, the subjective discount factor ¯, the capital depreciation rate
±, the probability of not reoptimizing price º, and the policy parameters ¿;°, but not on the
other model parameters, e.g. the intertemporal substitution elasticity ¾ and the money-related
parameters ´c;´R;Â.
In the two special cases of ° = 0;1, Proposition 1 can be reduced to the next two corollaries.
Corollary 1 In the case of in°ation-forecast targeting interest rate policy, i.e. ° = 1 in (21),
a necessary and su±cient condition for determinacy of equilibrium is the Taylor principle (23)
and












Corollary 2 In the case of current-in°ation targeting interest rate policy, i.e. ° = 0 in (21),
a necessary and su±cient condition for determinacy of equilibrium is the Taylor principle (23)
and
0 < ¿2 +
¯(1 ¡ ®)(a2)2 ¡ ®(¸a1 + a2)
®2¸
¿ +
¯a2[®¸ + (1 ¡ ¯)a2]
(®¸)2 : (27)
7To be precise, this condition is su±cient for determinacy but only generically necessary. Throughout this
paper, consideration of non-generic boundary cases is omitted.
9Further, if ¸a1 > (2¯ ¡ 1)a2, only the Taylor principle (23) is the necessary and su±cient
condition.8
Unlike these Corollaries, Propositions 1 and 2 of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) provide a
necessary, but not su±cient, condition for determinacy.
To illustrate our necessary and su±cient condition in Proposition 1, we use the same calibra-
tion of model parameters as Carlstrom and Fuerst, except the probability of not reoptimizing
price º: ® = 1=3, ¯ = 0:99, and ± = 0:02. Since the actual value of º is controversial in
empirical literature, we examine three values of º = 1=2;2=3;3=4, which imply that ¯rms re-
optimize prices, on average, once every two, three, and four quarters, respectively.9 Under
these calibrations we have ¸a1 > (2¯ ¡ 1)a2. Figure 1 shows a region of the pair of the policy
response to average in°ation and the relative weight of the in°ation forecast f¿;°g that guaran-
tees determinacy. The average-in°ation targeting interest rate policy (21) ensures determinacy
as long as ¿ is su±ciently large and ° is su±ciently small, that is, both the response to average
in°ation and the relative weight of current in°ation are large enough. When ° is close to one,
the average-in°ation targeting policy (21) induces indeterminacy, even if the Taylor principle
(23) is satis¯ed, due to the cost channel of monetary policy explained before.
2.2 PAST-INFLATION TARGETING INTEREST RATE POLICY
We turn next to the analysis of past-in°ation targeting interest rate policy
logRt = logR + ¿ (log¼t¡1 ¡ log¼): (28)
Although there is di±culty in explicitly deriving determinacy conditions for this policy, we
have the following useful result.
Proposition 2 In the model with past-in°ation targeting interest rate policy (28), the neces-
sary and su±cient condition for determinacy of equilibrium depends on the cost share of capital
8This part of Corollary 2 follows from Proposition 2 of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005).
9Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) use the value of ¸ = 1=3, which implies that º = 0:57 if ¯ = 0:99.
10®, the subjective discount factor ¯, the capital depreciation rate ±, the probability of not reop-
timizing price º, and the response to past in°ation ¿, but not on the other model parameters.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The same calibration of model parameters as used above then shows that the past-in°ation
targeting interest rate policy (28) guarantees determinacy when its response ¿ satis¯es the
Taylor principle (23) and is not large. For instance, the three values of the probability of not
reoptimizing price, º = 1=2;2=3;3=4, yield the determinacy regions 1 < ¿ < 1:35, 1 < ¿ < 2:02,
and 1 < ¿ < 3:02, respectively. The past-in°ation targeting policy (28) induces indeterminacy
unless it meets the Taylor principle. Even when the Taylor principle is satis¯ed, this policy
generates no stable equilibrium if its response to past in°ation is too large.
2.3 NASH BARGAINING OVER WAGES AND HOURS WORKED
Recent literature has seen much interest in implications of labor market search and matching
frictions for sticky price models, as mentioned before. In these models, ¯rms pay a cost of post-
ing vacancies in order to adjust their employment, and wages and hours worked are determined
by bargaining between ¯rms and workers. This subsection examines whether introducing Nash
bargaining over wages and hours worked into our baseline model alters determinacy conditions,
as addressed by Zanetti (2006). Because it is di±cult to analytically investigate determinacy
in sticky price models with investment and labor market search and matching frictions, our
model with the Nash bargaining is motivated as a ¯rst step toward such an analytical investiga-
tion. To this end, a representative wholesale intermediate-good ¯rm and a continuum of retail
intermediate-good ¯rms are introduced.10 The wholesale ¯rm bargains with the representative
household over wages and hours worked and produces output yt under perfect competition
10If the original intermediate-good ¯rms bargain with the household, the model is highly intractable due to
the ¯rms' Calvo-style staggered price setting. The distinction between wholesale and retail intermediate-good
¯rms is inconsequential for the robustness exercise, since this distinction can be analogously introduced in the
baseline model without a®ecting the equilibrium conditions.
11using the Cobb-Douglas production technology yt = K®
t¡1L1¡®
t . The retail ¯rms purchase the
wholesale goods at the real price zt and di®erentiate them at no cost to set their prices on the
Calvo-style staggered basis.
The Nash bargaining sets the pair of the real wage rate and hours worked fwt;Ltg so as to











where the ¯rst and the second terms represent respectively the household's and the wholesale
¯rm's surpluses and µ 2 [0;1] is the household's relative bargaining power. Since Pt¤t = Uc(t)


















The condition (30) shows that the real wage wtLt is composed, for the fraction µ, by the
wholesale ¯rm's real revenues ztLt=x®
t = ztK®
t¡1L1¡®
t and, for the remaining fraction 1 ¡ µ, by
the household's labor disutility in terms of ¯nal goods Lt=Uc(t) = Lt=(Pt¤t). More importantly,
using (31) to substitute out wt from (30) yields the same labor input condition as (9). This
suggests that hours worked satisfy the same equilibrium condition as in the baseline model
while the wage plays a distributive role.
The equilibrium conditions in the presence of the Nash bargaining are given by (4), (5),
(8)¡(13), (31), and the law of motion of the intermediate-good price dispersion dt. Log-
linearizing the equilibrium conditions and rearranging the resulting equations yields the same
equations as (14)¡(21), and therefore equilibrium dynamics is determined by the system of ¯ve
equations (18)¡(22) with ¯ve variables ^ ¼t; ^ xt; ^ zt; ^ Kt¡1; ^ Rt. Consequently, introducing the Nash
bargaining into the baseline model never alters the determinacy implications presented before.
Proposition 3 In the model with Nash bargaining over the real wage rate and hours worked,
a necessary and su±cient condition for determinacy of equilibrium is the same as that given in
12Proposition 1. Also, the determinacy properties of past-in°ation targeting interest rate policy
(28) are the same as in the baseline model.
This result demonstrates the failure of Proposition 1 of Zanetti (2006), which claims that
in the presence of the Nash bargaining, the in°ation-forecast targeting interest rate policy, the
current-in°ation targeting interest rate policy, and the past-in°ation targeting interest rate
policy all induce indeterminacy for any value of the policy response to in°ation. That result
is due to the fact that the period t + 1 real wage rate equation is erroneously included in the
dynamic system of equations shown in Appendix A of Zanetti (2006).
It is important to stress that if a de¯nitional equation like the wage rate condition (14) is
included in a dynamic system then one should be very careful with the Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) root-counting approach for equilibrium determinacy, i.e. matching up the number of
unstable eigenvalues with the number of non-predetermined variables. While this approach
works for most cases, it can sometimes go wrong. Sims (2002) shows that the correct condition
for determinacy is that the column space spanned by the lag matrix in a system is contained in
the row space spanned by the lead matrix. Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) give a simple example
of how this computation can be done by hand.
3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In a sticky price model with investment, we have examined a necessary and su±cient condition
for determinacy of equilibrium under interest rate policy that targets a weighted average of an
in°ation forecast and current in°ation. This condition has shown that such average-in°ation
targeting policy ensures determinacy as long as both the response to average in°ation and the
relative weight of current in°ation are large enough. We have also shown that past-in°ation
targeting interest rate policy guarantees determinacy when its response satis¯es the Taylor
principle and is not large. These results still hold even when wages and hours worked are
determined by Nash bargaining rather than being determined in a competitive labor market.
13APPENDIX A
This appendix presents the proof of Proposition 1. Let a1 = 1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ®) and a2 =
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±). Using the average-in°ation targeting interest rate policy (21) to substitute out










































1=¯ ¡®¸=¯ ¡¸=¯ 0
C21 C22 C23 0
C31 C32 C33 0
























where C21 = (1 ¡ a2)C31=a2, C22 = (1 ¡ a2)C32=a2, C23 = ¡1 ¡ ¸(1 ¡ a2)(¿° ¡ 1)=(¯a2),
C31 = ¿(1 ¡ °) + (¿° ¡ 1)=¯, C32 = ¡®¸(¿° ¡ 1)=¯, and C33 = 1 ¡ ¸(¿° ¡ 1)=¯.11
Then we can show that four eigenvalues of the matrix C are 1+c=K(> 1) and three solutions
to the cubic equation
¹3 + b2¹2 + b1¹ + b0 = 0; (33)
where b2 = ¡1 ¡ 1=¯ + ¸a1(¿° ¡ 1)=(¯a2), b1 = 1=¯ + ¸[¡®(¿° ¡ 1) + a1¿(1 ¡ °)]=(¯a2), and
b0 = ¡®¸¿(1 ¡ °)=(¯a2).
Because the system (32) contains only one predetermined variable, ^ Kt¡1, it follows from
Proposition 1 of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) that the necessary and su±cient condition for
determinacy of equilibrium is that the cubic equation (33) has exactly one solution inside the
unit circle and the other two outside the unit circle. By Proposition C.2 of Woodford (2003),
this is the case if and only if either of the following two cases is satis¯ed.
Case I : 1 + b2 + b1 + b0 < 0; ¡1 + b2 ¡ b1 + b0 > 0;
Case II : 1 + b2 + b1 + b0 > 0; ¡1 + b2 ¡ b1 + b0 < 0; (b0)2 ¡ b0b2 + b1 ¡ 1 > 0 or jb2j > 3:
The three conditions in Case II can be reduced to (23)¡(25), respectively.
11The forms of C41, C42, and C43 are omitted, since they are not needed in what follows.
14To complete the proof of this proposition, we show that Case I never holds. Assume ¯rst
that 0 · ° · 1=2. Then, the second condition in Case I induces a contradiction




Assume next that 1=2 < ° · 1. Combining the two conditions in Case I yields a contradiction




Thus, (23)¡(25) are the necessary and su±cient condition for determinacy.
APPENDIX B
This appendix presents the proof of Proposition 2. Let a2 = 1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±). Using the past-
in°ation targeting interest rate policy (28) to substitute out ^ Rt from (19) and (22) and letting
~ zt = ^ zt ¡ ®^ xt, the system of ¯ve equations (18)¡(20), (22), and (28) can be rewritten as12










1=¯ ¡®¸=¯ ¡¸=¯ 0 0
(a2 ¡ 1)=(¯a2) ®¸(1 ¡ a2)=(¯a2) ¡1 + ¸(1 ¡ a2)=(¯a2) 0 ¿(1 ¡ a2)=a2
¡1=¯ ®¸=¯ 1 + ¸=¯ 0 ¿
0 D42 D43 1 + c=K D45









Because the system (34) contains two predetermined variables, ^ Kt¡1 and ^ ¼t¡1, it follows
from Proposition 1 of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) that the necessary and su±cient condition
for determinacy of equilibrium is that the matrix D has two eigenvalues inside the unit circle
and the other three outside the unit circle. Then we can show that ¯ve eigenvalues of the
12The forms of D42, D43, and D45 are omitted, since they are not needed in what follows.








1=¯ ¡®¸=¯ ¡¸=¯ 0
(a2 ¡ 1)=(¯a2) ®¸(1 ¡ a2)=(¯a2) ¡1 + ¸(1 ¡ a2)=(¯a2) ¿(1 ¡ a2)=a2
¡1=¯ ®¸=¯ 1 + ¸=¯ ¿








where ¸ = (1 ¡ º)(1 ¡ ¯º)=º and a2 = 1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±). This matrix ~ D depends on the cost share
of capital ®, the subjective discount factor ¯, the capital depreciation rate ±, the probability
of not reoptimizing price º, and the policy response to past in°ation ¿, but not on the other
model parameters. Therefore, this property is true for the necessary and su±cient condition
for determinacy.
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Figure 1: Region of the pair of the policy response to the weighted average in°ation and the relative
weight of the in°ation forecast f¿;°g that guarantees determinacy of equilibrium.
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